Introduction
Recent teaching and research commitments led me to touch upon the field of international economic relations, an expression deliberately wider than International Economics. Dealing with the global and European imbalances and crisis and, particularly with the behaviour of Germany (Cesaratto 2011a (Cesaratto , 2011b , it was natural to look for analytical approaches that went beyond the political rhetoric of international cooperation reinforced by the economic mainstream beliefs on the harmonic virtues of international laissez-faire. Some Sraffian contributions to the demolition of those beliefs were, of course, well known to me -although, unfortunately, less known to students of international economic relations, let alone of International Economics. The pre-laissez-faire age, mercantilist tradition was another natural candidate to my attention. This was also suggested by the frequent accusation of mercantilist behaviour moved to Germany examined in my works.
Mercantilism, the world of non-harmony, may be envisaged as an underground tradition -that a group of north-European economists has denominated 'the other canon' (www.othercanon.org) -parallel to the laissez-faire tradition, both classical and neoclassical. Kalecki's view of net exports as a way to realise profits also leads to a conflict view of inter-bourgeoisies relations. Finally, a cynical view springs also from Political Realism, a major tradition in Science Policy. One intellectual father of Political Realism is Thomas Hobbes, contemporaneous of many British mercantilists. In this view, a social contract is possible at the domestic level by attributing the authority to the Prince, but not at the international level where no sovereign state would recognise a higher authority. Mercantilism and Political Realism converge in one main tradition within International Political Economy (IPE), a field born at the beginning of the early 1970s as an attempt to bridge the gap between International Economics and the science policy field of International * Given the preliminary status of this paper, the English has not yet been revised by a professional translator.
Relations (Strange 1970) . Let us call this particular approach within IPE 'International Political Realism'. This is traditionally opposed to a liberal tradition that holds a more harmonic view of the international economic relations. International Political Economy has recently begun to be colonised by neoclassical-trained policy scientists. The Sraffian criticism of neoclassical economics, especially in the field of International Economics, would therefore appear remarkably precious to meet the neoclassical imperialism. The nation-state is at the centre of both the mercantilist and International Political Realism' traditions. The Classical, Marxist and the modern surplus approach are not in easy terms with the notion of nation-state -Capital is cosmopolitan, although capitalists likely not -, so that to touch upon this topic was unavoidable.
The paper will explore this intellectual track as a suggestion to further developments and contaminations among different traditions proposing disharmonic views of domestic and international economic relations in opposition to the harmonic beliefs of the marginalist school. The big question here is the narrow space left in the economic profession in Italy and elsewhere to this sort of intellectual perspectives.
European imbalances in the global crisis: which theoretical lessons?
The recent European experience shows how the most doctrinaire versions of mainstream theory and policies can jeopardise the welfare of one of the wealthier parts of the globe. Known under the label of Washington Consensus in developing countries, in the new century those policies were largely discredited and abandoned by those countries, where they had led to one economic and social disaster after another. On the opposite they have been adapted and adopted by the European countries embarking in one of the worse experiment in economics, the European Monetary Union (EMU). 1 In pursuing this experiment, that in some cases shows an impressive resemblance to the Argentinean experience, the European ruling classes were not, of course, totally blind, that is guided by economic ideology only. The participation to the European Monetary Union (EMU) by the European dominant economy marks indeed a considerable degree of continuity with her post World War 2 policy stance that defined by a leading German economic historian, 'monetary mercantilism' (cf. Cesaratto e Stirati 2011). The involvement of the other countries in the enterprise, leaving aside foreign policy motivations, has to be found in the idea of 'importing the German discipline'. The main difference with the European Monetary System that preceded the EMU is that the latter included an exit clause insofar as the member countries retained their own currency. Within the EMU all countries boarded the same boat sinking the lifeboats once left the port. The exit clause thus precluded, the voice clause within the monetary union has been ineffective. In particular any timid attempt by France to change the union policy stance has met a firm German rebuff.
The fiscal clauses envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty took preventively care of the possible opportunistic behaviour of governments in peripheral countries that could use the monetary union to finance public spending by issuing public debt at lower interest rates. At the price of giving a large degree of inflexibility and recessive bias to the European economic policy framework, this part of the Treaty worked: only the centre-right government of a marginal country, Greece, used this opportunity in a fraudulent way to expand her nepotistic expenditure. The ultimate causes of the current European crisis cannot therefore be found in the European government profligacy, although now, disgustingly, the economic adversity is used to attack the welfare states.
The main cause can be found in the easier access to the European financial markets at low nominal interest rates for a number of peripheral UMU countries that followed the participation to the EMU (European Commission 2009 , 2010 . Access to credit at easier terms than in the past determined a growth of domestic demand in these countries and a nominal wage dynamics both above the central EMU participants. The growth of domestic demand was associated to a housing bubble in Spain and Ireland, 2 and to the growth of public spending in Greece. According to standard theory, periphery countries were importing capital to 'catch up' the core members. However, growth based on the construction sector is not such to generate significant productivity and export growth. Anyway, sluggish productivity growth and, more importantly, the above-average wage dynamic, led those countries to a progressive loose of international competitiveness. The combination of bubbly imports and slothful exports led those members to persistent current account deficits and to the accumulation of foreign debt. Core Europe's exports benefited most from these events and saved them from negative growth rates. Symmetrically to the deficit countries, Germany has shown a structural weakness of domestic demand due to the feeble dynamics of nominal wages, following the labour market reforms, the restrictive fiscal policies, adopted in previous years, and the relatively high real interest rates associated to the low domestic inflation. This experience makes justice of many neoclassical precepts in International Economics, although the scepticism expressed particularly by American mainstream economists mainly on the basis of the 'optimal currency areas' argument must be recognised. 4 To begin with, this is a negative test for the Hekchscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem according to which in the long run countries would specialise in the industries that use more of the factor they are endowed relatively more. In this view, in the long run countries would enjoy both full employment and an equilibrium balance of trade. Using the results of the capital theory controversy, Sraffian economists have long time ago demolished the analytical basis of this theorem. We shall return on this.
Secondly, according to conventional theory, international trade and factors' mobility are substitutes (Mundell 1957 ). An advanced country, for instance, might export goods and services produced with relative high capita/labour intensity, and import labour-intensive commodities or, alternatively, export capital and import labour. In both the events, factors' marginal products would globally level off. In principle, '[t] hanks to the euro and the EU financial integration converging economies in the euro area generally benefited from large capital inflows over the past decade' (European Commission 2009: 34) . Standard theory suggests indeed that capital would move from industrialised to catching up countries, from countries were capital is relatively abundant and its marginal product relatively low to countries were the opposite is true (e.g. Blanchard e Giavazzi 2002). 5 Alas, however, 'foreign capital was not always channelled to the most productive uses and therefore not always very conducive to growth… Consumption obviously has no impact on production potential' (European Commission 2009: 31). leading 1.8 percent rate). Felix Hüfner, an economist who heads the O.E.C.D.'s German desk, took the contrarian critique a step further. He argues -controversially, he admits -that German success comes thanks to price competitiveness via static wages and enforced by industry's occasional threats to unions to move production out of the country. Indeed, Mr. Hüfner says there is strong evidence that so-called "German quality" is not an essential factor'. 4 See footnote 1 above.
Conventional economists and pundits often present moralistic arguments to condemn supposedly profligate countries that dissipate foreign resources instead of investing them. 6 In so doing they neglect the very fact that the events they are condemning took place in a laissez-faire framework, without any state intervention. It seems then they hold a wishful thinking theory of market behaviour, whereas real markets, if left free to operate, lead in a direction opposed to the desired one. The theory should be blamed, not disobedient market-led behaviours and results.
More specifically, the idea that there is something called marginal product of capital relatively higher in catching up countries, where the capital-labour ratio is lower, and vice versa in developed countries, is wrong. It should be appreciated that in the case of foreign investment, no less than in the domestic case, the idea that domestic saving may find an automatic debouche in investment in periphery countries depends on the neoclassical saving -investment relationship and it is therefore subject to the Keynesian and capital theory critiques. In the non-orthodox context there is no automatic mechanism that would translate the larger (potential) saving supply into domestic or foreign investment since a fall in the rate of interest does not affect investment either in the domestic economy or in that of other countries (see Garegnani 1983 and, on the savinginvestment relation in the open economy, Dalziel and Harcourt, 1997) .
The conventional approach to international capital flows, according to which surplus countries -those which present an excess of domestic saving over domestic investment -lend this excess to borrowing countries (those who invest more than the domestic saving supply) should be so re-expressed. In absence of controls over capital inflows, the international private financial institutions are able to create credit facilities to periphery countries that use them to increase their imports -only in the most fortunate cases of investment goods, more often of consumption goods, as open minded mainstream economists have also shown (Prasad et al. 2007) . It is this increasing demand of exports in favour of the 'core' countries that generates the 'twin surpluses' in these countries (a excess domestic excess of savings over public and/or private consumption and a current account surplus), in which the increasing exports determines a rise of income and saving, and the corresponding 'twin deficits' in the periphery countries. In this alternative account, 'credit precedes investment and both precede savings', as Kriesler and Halevi (1996, p.309) effectively put it, and the saving-investment gap is 'nothing but the ex post accounting result of the operation'. 7 The issue will be touched upon again in section 6.
6 German politicians, opinion makers and standard economists have traditionally been champions in blaming the 'profligate' countries way of not using capital imports in productive manner using them 'to live beyond their means ' (Wadebrook 1972: 255 ; see also Cesaratto, Stirati 2010 (2010) who in this regard argues: 'outside classical "corn economies" the saving-first vision and related neoclassical loanable funds theory of interest are deeply flawed (…). Simply put, in the context of monetary production economies the supposed excess saving (or: saving glut) can only arise together with the corresponding excess spending being done by someone else, somewhere. Just as spending in general presupposes money to be effectuated, any spending in excess of income in particular requires advance "financing," too (financing in the sense of "command over money," not saving, that is). In this particular case, U.S. spending in excess of income required dollar liquidity to be effectuated, dollar liquidity which may then perhaps partly "spill out" of the United States, only to "return" in the form of Treasury purchases (as foreign monetary authorities use the excess dollars collected from their exporters to purchase U.S. Treasuries while issuing national debt instruments to mop up the liquidity thereby created). So it is not any "saving glut," but dollar liquidity, in the first instance, which allows spending to go ahead, and global spending (and saving or current account) imbalances to arise in the process. The idea of a global saving glut depressing interest rates in global capital markets and thereby stimulating a U.S. housing boom is not a sound one' (ibid: 6-7). Mutatis mutandis, Germans banks created loans in euros to periphery countries that returned to Germany by stimulating German exports thus creating the German twin surpluses.
therefore natural to look at other traditions to complement the Sraffian and Keynesian criticism of neoclassical International Economics and support non rhetoric visions of international economic relations.
Mercantilism and laissez-faire
Classic treatises on Mercantilism, Furniss (1920) , Suviranta (1923) On a similar vwein, according to Heckscher (1955: 285) Mercantilism was amoral, breaking in this with the middle age: 'The welfare of society or, in actual fact, the welfare of the state was substituted in place of the amelioration of the individual. This was a perfectly simple corollary of the raison d'état, or pure Machiavellism. …In addition the raison d'état was conceived emphatically as materialistic or economic' (ibid: 286). Mercantilism was amoral also with regard to the means. In particular, the pursuing of the individual interest was seen as functional to the state welfare, although it might have to be regulated to that purpose (ibid: 298 and passim). Heckscher regards such a vision as opposite to that of the laissez-faire economists influenced by the Utilitarian goal of improving social happiness, seen as the summation of the individual welfare (ibidem). In this view both the individual and the state serve the 'community', whereas the mercantilists held a more cynical view in which both the individual and the community served the state (ibid: 328-9).
According to Heckscher mercantilists thought in terms of nation-states, and did not regard the individuals within the nation as equal.
Rational thought pervaded Mercantilism: 'Rationalism characterized mercantilism to so high a degree. There was little mysticism in the arguments. …this rationalism expressed itself in references to nature. Nature was conceived as a factor which also influenced the social sphere, social life being placed parallel to physical life of the individual; and society was regarded as a body with functions similar to those of the physical body' (ibid: 308). The mercantilists, therefore, as well as laissez-faire theories believed in the possibility of discovering natural laws. The difference with the laissez-faire theorists is that mercantilists did not regard public intervention as interference to the benign working of those laws, but as their natural complement. Mercantilists did not believe in a 'immanent social rationality' (Heckscher: 321) , that is in an objective economic harmony, whereas the laissez-fair 'went so far in its belief in the domination of natural laws in society that it believed in an immanent reason in the free play of forces' (ibid: 323).
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Heckscher regarded the victory of laissez-faire theories over mercantilism as temporary.
During the nineteenth century they were submerged by the historicist and nationalistic doctrines:
'Society was regarded as a growth in the highest degree naturally determined, to be changed only by slow and gently progressive treatment, bound to tradition, each individual nation containing inherent and more or less ineradicable peculiarities' (ibid: 334). According to the Swedish economist, laissez-faire doctrines also failed in their alleged humanitarian aims. Indeed what they did, Heckscher argues, was to support measures that protected the individual against the state, but they failed to protect it against the market, 'against the pressure of social conditions, which did not have their origins in definite measures of the state but which, on the contrary, demanded such measures if they were to be abolished. On this point -Heckscher continues -laissez-faire was obstructed by its belief in natural rights, i.e. its belief in a predetermined harmony, to which was added in practical policy the influence of employer and capitalist interests' (ibid: 337). Heckscher observes that, paradoxically but not incidentally, social reforms were supported and adopted by the conservatives: 'economic policy being bound to with the duty of the patriarchal state to care for the welfare of its subjects" while "the fear of …socialism also goaded politicians into finding remedies'
(ibid: 337).
The domestic social surplus and the foreign trade surplus
Talking of James Steuart, the last great mercantilist, Marx argues that although he represents the clearer expression of the theory of 'profits upon alienation', he 'does not share the illusion that the surplus-value which accrues to the individual capitalist from selling the commodity above its value is a creation of new wealth' (Theories of Surplus Value, 1861-3, quotation from www.marxists.org/archive), that is there is the idea that the surplus value is the result of one side taking advantage of another, although the 'unequal exchange' that gives place to a surplus value takes place, for Marx, in the labour not in the commodity market. The classic treaties on mercantilism also underline the clash between the mercantilists' view of distribution and that of the 'modern' marginal theory.
Furniss regards wage determination in Mercantilism as affected by the interests of the dominant classes, something far removed from the marginalist notion of wages as the natural reward of labour linked to its (marginal) contribution to production (1923: 198-203) . The contrast between the latter view of labour as 'the source of national wealth' and the mercantilist recommendation of low wages led Furniss to read in mercantilism 'the germs of the socialist doctrine' (ibid: 25), term by which he denotes the classical surplus approach. Indeed, only few mercantilists clearly anticipated the classical concept of surplus, and almost none came close to see the origin of a foreign surplus in the existence of a domestic surplus of production over consumption. 10 But the concept was, so to speak, there when, for instance, they regarded the unemployed as a burden to the nation, implicitly alluding that they lived out of a surplus produced by the employed population, and argued that their productive utilisation would have increased the riches of the nation (e.g. ibid:.41-47 and 89-95). 11 In a famous example, Petty alludes to the ability of one section of the population to sustain the rest, including those that produce export goods (e.g.
10 See the authors quoted by Furniss (1923: 25-6) , for instance Chamberlen (1649): 'This may be a note to all man, especially to statesmen to look no more upon the poor as a burden but as the richest treasure of a nation, if orderly and well-employed. Which is the more manifest if we consider first, that though they multiply more than the rich they do not only feed and clothe themselves but the rich men are fed were employed in useful labour our manufactures would be so increased that the commonwealth could be thereby greatly enriched and the poor, instead of being a charge, would be a benefit to the Kingdom' (quoted by Furniss: 91) .
Suppose that the social product just consists of necessities:
, where N and N'
represent the necessities of the L workers and of the U unemployed, respectively, both receiving a real wage equal to w, so that
Defining per capita output L P = π , we get:
In other words, the unemployed survive out of the surplus produced by each worker above its own subsistence (it must be w > π otherwise the unemployed would have already died). If the unemployed are put to work, the social product would become:
and the social surplus:
. Now a larger surplus can be used to sustain an unproductive class (not consisting of unemployed, this time) or exported.
However, only in a late mercantilist quoted by Furniss, William Hay -an author likely influenced by Petty -we find a clear coordination between the existence of a domestic social surplus and that of a foreign trade surplus:
12 "The source of wealth is from the number of its inhabitants; …the more populous a country is, the richer it is or may be … For the earth is grateful and repays their labour not only with enough but with an abundance…Now whatever they have more than they consume, the surplus is the riches of the nation. This surplus is sent to other nations and is there exchanged or sold, and this is the trade of the nation. If the nation to which it is sent cannot give goods in exchange to the same value they must pay for the remainder in money; which is the balance of trade; and the nation that hath that balance in her favour must increase in wealth" (1751, quoted by italics in Furniss) .
Using the same symbols employed above, the coordination between the two surpluses can thus be synthesised. In a surplus-producing economy we have:
The social surplus can have a number of destinations: capitalists' consumption c C , capital accumulation I and net exports
If, for simplicity c C e I are zero, we obtain:
The centrality of the national output and employment and of the trade surplus
As seen, Mercantilism appears to have accorded primacy to production rather than to consumption, as in later laissez-faire theories. 13 The goal of maximising domestic production and employment, accompanied by the minimisation of domestic consumption and imports of superfluous goods, was finalised to obtain the larger possible foreign trade surplus, famously seen by many mercantilists as the origin on net wealth for the nation. Influenced by Kalecki's lesson we may now interpret a foreign trade surplus as a way capitalists realise the domestic social surplus they do not consume or invest. As seen, however, although somehow close to coordinate the internal and external surpluses, it cannot be said that the mercantilists were successful in this regard.
So, what we are left with is, on the one hand, some hints especially by later mercantilists to the social surplus as the origin of net wealth (intended as that part of the social surplus that can be consumed or accumulated without endangering the reproduction of the system on at least the same scale) and, on the other, the idea that the origin of net wealth is in the foreign trade surplus. How did they justify this second origin of net wealth or, anyway, the importance they attributed to the trade surplus?
(i) Supposing with Marx that most Mercantilists held a theory of 'profit upon alienation', the conclusion would naturally follow that net gains for the nation as a whole can only be obtained by foreign trade (Heckscher 1955: 193 So, there are no profits if the product is sold at home, but positive profits if consumption is kept at a minimum (by importing cheap foreign commodities) and output sold abroad. This is certainly not Kalecki: profits means here revenues for the nation, not for capitalists 14 and, as seen above, almost without exceptions mercantilists did not clearly perceive the existence of a domestic surplus as the basis for a foreign surplus. Nonetheless a Kaleckian flavour might still be perceived, as if they were pointing into the right direction.
(ii) the importance attributed by the mercantilists to the trade surplus may be linked to the importance that they seem to have attributed to the maximisation of domestic output and employment by minimizing imports and maximising exports, and vice versa, to the maximisation of domestic employment to reduce imports and increase exports. 15 In this regard Johnson (1937: 302) talks of a 'balance of work', the difference between the labour content of exports and imports, respectively (see also Furniss 1920 : 13-4, Suviranta 1923 Heckscher 1955: 366) . Imports were seen as a subtraction to domestic employment, and exports as labour 'paid by foreigners'.
Low wages were seen by mercantilists -although not unanimously -as a way to keep domestic consumption and imports at bay (Heckscher 1955: 364) , keep production costs low (ibid 152-53), and encourage hard work (Furniss 1920: Chapt. 4) . A low wage economy was thus a central objective for a typical mercantilist (Furniss, 1920, 8, 40; Heckscher 1955, pp.46, 163-5, 121-153/4, 365) .
A reflection might be timely here. We might distinguish a policy of import substitution from an export-led economy. The mercantilist position is evocative of both.
(a) In Keynesian terms, a policy of import substitution that, say, decreases the marginal propensity to import, has (ceteris paribus) a positive effect on the domestic output and employment and, given the level of exports, on the trade balance. In addition to the initial benefit on output and employment, by relaxing the foreign balance of trade constraint, an import substitution policy can thus also leave more space to growth policies based on the growth of the domestic market. So, in this case, the improvement in foreign trade is functional to the development of the domestic market, not an objective per se.
(b) A low wage economy would also keep imports at bay -assuming that imports of superior goods are linked to the level of real wages. This policy, however, is hardly functional to the development of a domestic market, but rather conducive to an export-led model. Once a policy decision to depress the domestic market is taken as a consequence of a low wage policy, then an export-led model is the only game in town, sustained in turn by the low labour costs. The ensuing trade surplus depends on the one hand on sustained exports and on the other on the compression of imports, also due to low wages. This description of a low-wages, export-led economy would suit the mercantilist idea of imports as paying foreign labour, and exports as domestic labour paid by foreigners. In the light of the Kakeckian/surplus approach theory, in this economy capitalists 15 'Once people had once arrived at the view that a surplus of goods was something undesirable, the connection between this and the amount of employment followed inevitably' (Heckscher 1955 maximise the domestic surplus they extract from workers, and get rid of it by net exports. This case seems to suit the German post-ww2 case, on which I shall briefly return below.
(iii) Although a popular interpretation of mercantilism regards the mere accumulation of species as the object of a trade surplus, mercantilists seems to have maintained that a net influx of precious metals would be functional to the growth of the domestic money supply, lowered the interest rate and favoured economic activity (Heckscher 1955: 204, 208-9, 217-8 and passim (iv) Finally, the goal of a foreign trade surplus can be interpreted as a way to generate international relative political power. 16 Famously, the relative importance of power and wealth was object of a controversy between Heckscher (1955: I24 and passim) and Viner (1948) , both acknowledging that the two objective were mutually sustaining each other, but with Heckscher giving primacy to power and Viner to wealth.
The mercantilist tradition has indeed been perceived as putting the reasons of the nationstate at the centre of the analysis, contrary to the cosmopolitan views of individualistic laissez-faire theories, but also of Marx's stateless capital: 'the state stood at the centre of mercantilist endeavours as they developed historically: the state was both the subject and the object of mercantilistic economic policy' (Heckscher 1955: I 21) .In short, mercantilism is 'the economic system of nationalism' (ibid: 13). 17 The political importance of relative economic and political power for the national dominant elites' interests embodied in a persistent trade surplus, indicator of enduring competitive and financial strength cannot be easily dismissed. The notion of nation-state is discussed again in section 7.
In my view, the later reception of the mercantile tradition is as much important as the precise interpretation of their original thought. In my discussion of the presumed German mercantilism (Cesaratto 2011 ; Cesaratto e Stirati 2011) I see the pursue of an export-led growth -and of the trade 16 Heckscher (1955: II, 317) argues that the 'obsession with power also had this result, that the interest was taken not in the absolute total of commerce nor in the utility which it represented to the inhabitants of a particular country, but only in the superiority gained over other countries, irrespective of whether there was no absolute increase at all or perhaps even an absolute decline.' The best quotation he provides is from an important German mercantilist: 'Whether a nation be to-day mighty and rich or not depends not on the abundance or scarcity of its powers or riches, but principally on whether its neighbours possess more or less than it. For power and riches have become a relative matter, dependent on being weaker and poorer than others' (II, 22) . Locke would hold similar thesis (II, (22) (23) 17 Heckscher distinguishes between the Romanticist notion of nationalism concerned with traditions, ethnicity etc., and the secular Mercantilist identification of it with the State interest.
surplus as the yardstick of the working of the model -as a growth policy choice alternative to domestic-demand-led growth. In Germany, the latter was rejected by the influential ordo-liberal school as conducive to social indiscipline and inflation, regarded in turn as a disturbance to the market-led resource allocation. In this context, although not explicitly acknowledged, export-led growth remained the only game in town -a model that is conducive to, and is at the same time supported by, social discipline and wage restraint. As Ludwig Erhard (1897 Erhard ( -1977 , the economic ministry widely considered and designer of the German post-WW2 economic miracle, stated in 1953: 'foreign trade is not a specialized activity for a few who might engage in it, but the very core and even precondition of our economic and social order.' (quoted by Cronin 1996) . This model, as said, does perfectly fit the Kaleckian view of net exports as a way to realise the domestic surplus, and of financial capital flows as a way to finance expenditure by trade deficit countries. has become increasingly standardized, it has come to resemble nothing so much as the methodology of neoclassical economics, featuring the same penchant for positivist analysis, formal modelling, and where possible, the systematic collection and evaluation of empirical data' (ibid: 41-2). He also notes that political scientists 'have an inferiority complex when it comes to economics' (ibid: 42).
The mercantilist tradition and the International Political Economy
The new trend in IPE is called Open Economic Policy (OEP) and its methods are clearly those of standard neoclassical economists, as one leading member states:
OEP begins with sets of individuals -firms, sectors, factors of production -that can be reasonably assumed to share (nearly) identical interests. Relevant units of analysis vary by technology, institutions, and other factors. …units are not ontologically given nor are states the primary unit of analysis, although state policy is often the object to be explained. Deducing interests from economic theory was the essential innovation of OEP. … The movement of OEP towards economics is not driven, in my view, by disciplinary envy but by the insights that economic theory provides for political interpretations of policy choice. Building on established theories and models of economics also promotes the use of formal models and existing economic data sets in IPE. After specifying the interests of differing units, OEP turns to how these interests are aggregated through domestic political institutions. Institutions serve to define what political power means in a particular society, largely by setting the reversion point for policy in the absence of agreement between units. … tend to foster cooperative relations. Whereas politics tends to divide, economics tends to unite people (Gilpin, 1987: 31) . 24 Unfortunately, this sort of criticism is also shared by many non-conventional economists.
With domestic interests specified and aggregated through varying sets of institutions, OEP then understands states as bargaining to influence one another's behavior and, in turn, the joint outcome of their interactions. In focusing on bargaining, OEP once again emphasizes institutions, but now at the international level. …scholars sharing this epistemology are willing to sacrifice empirical richness and context for (1) more parsimonious, but therefore more fully specifiable theories, and (2) more narrow, but therefore more easily controlled empirical tests. (Lake 2009: 50, 52) Similarly to Gilpin, defences of traditional IPE point in the first place to the limitations of starting the analysis from the economic choices of rational individuals. As another leading old guard IPE member points out, a high price is paid by 'making preferences and interests exogenous, assuming that interests can be derived only from a rationalist model of human behaviour, excluding from analysis the constitutive aspects of institutional life, committing to an exclusively materialist conception of preferences and interests, and importing reductionist economic theories of politics' 25 Although well known, some passages from the Grundrisse are worth quoting: "Individuals producing in a society -hence socially determined individual production -is, of course, the point of departure. The individual and isolated hunter or fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural historian imagine. As little as Rousseau's contrat social, which brings naturally independent, autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such naturalism.. This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance of the Robinsonades, great and small. It is, rather, the anticipation of 'civil society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc., which in earlier historical periods
The production and reproduction of social life is a collective fact for Marx, although make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual -the product on the one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century -appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new epoch to this day. Steuart avoided this simple-mindness because as an aristocrat and in antithesis to the eighteen century, he had in some respects a more historical footing. The more deeply we go back to history , the more does the individual, and hence the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antithesis and fusions of the clans. Only in the eighteen century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (…) relations. The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society -a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness -is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other" (Marx 1957 (Marx [1973 : 82-3; italics in the original). To note the exception that Marx does with James Steuart (1712-80) defined elsewhere as 'the rational expression of the Monetary and Mercantile System' (Theories of Surplus Value, 1861-3, present quotation from www.marxists.org/archive). On the concept of social classes in James Steuart see Anderson and Tollison 1984: 458. In order better to understand the relationship between ontology and methodology in the study of international political economy, we would ideally like to examine the relationship between the ontological assumptions (that is, the basic understandings of how the world works) of the two main theoretical approaches to international political economy -rational choice and constructivism -and the methodological approaches and associated methodologiesstatistical or qualitative -that proponents of each ontology use to investigate the world….While we do not have space to provide a complete account of these ontologies and methodologies, we note that constructivism and rational choice accounts start from quite different accounts of how the world operates. Typically, constructivists employ ontologies that invoke mutual constitution and transformation, while rationalists, whether materialist or ideationalist, work from models in which actors' understandings of the world are complete and fixed…. On the basis of non-systematic observation, we suspected that there would be a strong and obvious relationship between ontology and methodology in IPE scholarship. IPE scholars adopting a rational choice (or, in our proxy, liberal …) ontology would be more likely to use quantitative methodology, and IPE scholars using a constructivist ontology would be more likely to use qualitative methodological techniques.
Similarly, the OPE exponent Lake (2009: 53) distinguishes between a more 'holistic', history oriented perspective, from the 'partial equilibrium' approach, but with little hope of a convergence:
Holistic analyses capture feedback effects necessarily ignored by the partial equilibrium approach, and generate insights into historical contingencies -those dimensions of context that are unique to particular events. Each type of explanation generates important but complementary insights into political events that, taken together, are undoubtedly more insightful and complete than either alone. Yet, it is unlikely that a large number of partial equilibrium analyses will ever sum to a holistic account, or that a holistic explanation can be broken down and tested as a series of comparative static propositions. Given the emphasis on feedback effects and contingency in holistic accounts, and their absence in partial equilibrium models, we have no reason to expect that either type of explanation scales up or down easily into the other. Thus, I am skeptical whether a seamless and sturdy bridge can be built across the epistemological divide identified by Cohen in transatlantic terms.
These two methodologies should not be regarded as a radically opposed. No doubt that what Lake defines as the more parsimonious and testable strategy derived from standard economics too often correspond to the neglect historical specificities in favour of simplistic hypothesis tested through exoteric statistical packages over large data bases. However, this does not preclude non neoclassical scholars to use, whenever useful, the same method, hopefully in a more careful wayand in principle also the opposite may be true, neoclassical economists looking at historical specificities through the lens of their theory. This is to say that it is to the substance of the theory that we should pay attention to, and only subordinately to research strategies. The relevance of the Sraffian criticism to the neoclassical foundations of methodological individualism, and its vindication of many aspects of the Marxian view has already been mentioned. The neoclassical offensive against a conflict view of international relations can also be rebuffed once a more rigorous criticism of neoclassical theory is acknowledged. To this we shall devote the next section.
The centrality attributed by International Political Realism to the State as the unit of analysis is also a troubled aspect. On the one hand the importance of the state as a guarantee of economic activities is correctly emphasised: 'as Carr has argued, every economic system must rest on a secure political base' (Gilpin: 47) . 28 On the other hand, Gilpin points out, in most IPE it is less convincingly, 'assumed that society and the State form a unitary identity and that foreign policy is determined by objective national interest', whereas, more correctly, 'foreign policy (including foreign economic policy) is in large measure the outcome of the conflicts among dominant groups within each society (ibid: 48). We refer to Cohen (2008: 125) for the debate in IPE (see also Katzenstein 1977: 604) . In the final section we shall visit this topic by comparing the view of Marx and List.
Comparative disadvantages?
The discussion Beginning from the first aspect, the H-O-S theorem may be rigorously expressed in terms of given endowment of non-produced production factors, say land and labour. On this basis the theory predicts that the country with the higher ratio of land to labour will export the land intensive commodity. The inclusion of 'capital' would, however, undermine the prediction that the country with the larger 'capital supply', and the lower interest rate, will export the most capital-intensive commodity. To begin with, there is the standard problem of measuring the 'given amount of capital' independently of distribution. Secondly, results in capital theory show that (supposing two sectors) the capital intensity ordering of the sectors may change with the fall of the interest rate; and that the price of a more capital-intensive commodity will not monotonically falls with the fall of the interest rate.
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Steedman also hint to the troubles in the neoclassical vision of capital flows already mentioned in section 2. The international mobility of 'production factors' is seen by conventional theory as alternative to international trade: at the end of the day it is the same whether a relatively 29 Steedman (1979a: 4-5) provides an exemplary clear summary of these results: "It cannot be taken for granted…that the properties of the HOS analysis with a given endowment of capital value are precisely analogous to the properties of the basic version with a given endowment of homogenous land. This for the simple reason that a 'capital value' cannot be defined other than in terms of relative prices, which are to be determined within the analysis. It is thus less transparent what is to be meant by saying that a country has a given endowment of capital value: in what units is this endowment measured? How does it come to be given in terms of, say, rice but not given in terms of, say, sunflower oil (for the relative price of rice and sunflower oil are to be determined within the analysis)? Even were these puzzles resolved, the question would remain whether, by analogy with the properties of the land-based analysis, the capital-labour intensity of production in each sector is inversely related to the rate of profit and whether the price of a more capital-intensive commodity always rises relative to that of a less capital-intensive commodity when the rate of profit increases. The question is critical, for the monotonic relations at issue together constitute the very heart of the HOS theory. Now it has been demonstrated conclusively…that the capital-labour ratio in any sector need not be inversely related to the rate of profit (…). Nor need the relative price of the more capital-intensive of two commodities rises as the rate of profit increases' (italics in the original).
always rises relative to that of a less capital-intensive commodity 'capital rich' country exports capital intensive commodities or, directly, 'capital'. Steedman points out that the idea of 'capital' as an aggregate value leads neoclassical economists to confuse capital flows as exports of physical equipment -something belonging to trade theory -and capital flows as financial flows. 30 The idea that capital flows correspond to capital rich countries lending savings to capital-poor countries is subject to the capital theory criticism as much as the domestic savinginvestment nexus (Garegnani 1983) . were a quantity of a homogenous, physical input, part of which may be used in domestic production, while the remainder is 'hired out' for use in another country! It is, perhaps, not entirely clear to what real world process such an analysis is supposed to correspond, unless it be the leasing of ships and aircraft. In the real world, international investment flows are, in themselves, financial flows. The latter will, of course, often lead directly to trade flows of the specific capital goods to be used in, say, equipping a factory but it is nevertheless crucial to keep the two types of flow conceptually distinct. That distinction is, however, always in danger of being lost in an analysis based on the conception of an aggregate 'factor' called 'capital', since, as is now widely recognised, that conception has fused -and confused -the concept of 'capital as finance' and 'capital as a specific means of production' (Steedman 1979b: 9-10) . 31 For instance assuming that with unemployed labour wages are close to the subsistence level determined on the basis of historically determined social norms. 32 In this light, the anti-Ricardianism of the colleagues of 'the other canon', mentioned at the beginning of this essay, appears particularly misplaced. ' When it finally took shape, Marxism was simultaneously a theory of history, economics, politics, and philosophy-and a program for the liberation of man that extended to all those areas. Marx postulated a connection between all spheres of human life, and his program dealt accordingly with all of them in a dialectical unity. Indeed, Marx claimed that his theory, while the result of his own intellectual endeavour, was also the reflection of objectively working historical forces and would therefore be carried out as a predestined outcome of historical development. Marx further thought that the proletariat was that "material force" whose historical task was to realize his philosophy. When one bears all of this in mind, it is easy to see why Marx found the theories of List, particularly his view of history and his program for the future, not only objectionable but aberrant. The doctrine of List, Marx was convinced, contradicted everything then taking place in the development of society-before his, and List's, eyes. It was axiomatic to Marx that industrial progress intensified and sharpened the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, an antagonism that would in the immediate future explode in a violent revolution. List, in the meantime, preached class cooperation and solidarity in the building of a nation's power. Marx thought that the Industrial Revolution, and the concomitant rule of the bourgeoisie, promoted the unification of the world and obliterated national differences. (Communism, he thought, would abolish nations themselves.) List claimed that the same phenomenon, the Industrial Revolution, intensified national differences and exacerbated conflicts among nations. While Marx saw the necessity of workers uniting across nations against the bourgeoisie, List called for the unification of all segments of a nation against other nations. '
There are indeed similarities and complementarities between the two approaches. Both see the market as a locus of conflict -among classes according to Marx, among nation-states for mercantilism. Behind modern economic nationalism there are the national bourgeoisies, but in many cases the working class may support nationalistic policies as far as they sustain domestic employment and wages: in this sense the two views overlaps and complement each other. Some further specifications are timely here.
(a) As widely acknowledged by Marx, a conflict view of income distribution based on the concept of the social surplus, that part of the social output that remains after the labourers' necessities are paid and that is appropriated by the dominant classes, was proper to the Classical economists too, particularly to Ricardo (Sraffa 1951; Garegnani 1984) . As said, this concept is only sporadically present in the mercantilist literature. Rather than to class conflict, mercantilist referred to international relations as a field of discord, given that no super-national authority would be recognised by sovereign states -whereas individual citizens would acknowledge the superior authority of the prince to sedate domestic conflicts. As said, classical economists tended, on the having open access to foreign markets (paraphrasing Joan Robinson [1966] and Carl Schmitt it may be argued that List regarded free trade 'as the continuation of mercantilism in other forms').
According to Marx, on the opposite, the Classical economists were actually decoding the secular and cosmopolitan characteristics of capitalism (Marx 1845; Szporluk, 1988, p.66 and passim) , in particular the conflicting interests of capital and labour that, in his opinion, went beyond the provincial boundaries of national states. Marx's criticism of List also uncovers the German national bourgeoisie's interests behind List's vivid description of national identities (there is a similarity with Adam Smith's criticism of mercantilist writers as prejudiced defenders of merchants' own interest). The expectation of a forthcoming revolution in Britain and its generalisation elsewhere likely led Marx to dismiss the importance of development of backward nations and to regard nationalism as an impediment to revolution rather than as necessary historical passage to developed capitalism. Like religion, to Marx the notions of political community and national identity are illusions and false consciousness (Szporluk, 1988: 58) Schmoller talks of 'real political economies as unified organisms, the centre of which should be, not merely a state policy reaching out in all directions, but rather the living heart-beat of a united sentiment' (50, italics in the original). And here we find the famous definition of mercantilism, later adopted by Heckscher: 'in its innermost kernel [mercantilism] is nothing but state making -not state making in a narrow sense, but state making and national-economy making at the same time;
state making in the modern sense. ... The essence of the system lies not in tariff barriers, protective duties, or navigation laws; but in something far greater: -namely, in the total transformation of society and its organisation, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial economic policy by that of the national state.' (ibid: 50-1). This is ideology, of course, but development economists, particularly Gerschenkron (1962: 24) , have later underlined the importance of nationalist ideologies 'igniting the imaginations' of people for the mobilisation of national resources at the early stages of industrialisation. Why in some nation/state a developmental bourgeoisies emerges from the previous social relations of productions, or perhaps the opposite question: how some pre-industrial social relation of production generate progressive pro-growth dominant classes, interested in a developmental state, is a little explored field. Neoclassical
Institutionalists seems unable to go beyond the mantra of the central role played by the protection of property rights in igniting growth. While this may somehow be part of the story, the best of it is still to be written.
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Conclusions
The recent European imbalances and crisis, an aspect of the global imbalances and crisis, gave us the occasion to compare the harmonic and disharmonic views of the international economic relations. The former, more liberal view is based on the neoclassical trade theory, with a frequent reference to the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages. The second tradition derives from the pre-Smithian mercantilist conflict views of international trade. We investigated the contribution that Sraffian theory can offer to the second stream of thought. This contribution cannot be underestimated since it provides a rigorous analytical rebuttal of the neoclassical theory of international trade and capital flows and support the existence of absolute advantages, source of potential trade conflicts among nations. Having said so, the paper opens more questions than it solves. More research is needed, for instance, on the contribution that mercantilist thought can bring to the Classical point of view. An alternative view of international capital flows also needs further developments, and this is also the case of the nature and role of the nation-state both within the domestic and the international conflicts. What is at stake is the space left in the economic profession by the dominant theory to these promising fields of research.
33 Meek (1976) points out that both Turgot and Smith regarded the protection of property rights as a result of development rather than a cause of it.
